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Cillian O’Gara 
European Energy Security 
Introduction 
In the wake of the European Union’s (EU) enlargements in 2004 and 2007, 
which saw the accession of 12 new member states, lengthy debates and 
discussion took place on the burden of onboarding the new member states, 
the difficulty of ensuring their compliance with EU rules and regulations and 
the dependence of many of these states on a single supplier for their energy 
needs. This paper aims to assess the EU’s efforts to form a comprehensive 
energy security policy in recent decades, paying particular attention to the 
development of the theory of energy security and the main developments of 
the EU’s energy security policy in recent years. The Energy Union, a flagship 
initiative launched by the European Commission in 2015, will be assessed 
through an examination of its governance structure and achievements in 
specific policy domains. 
Background 
In recent decades, European leaders and policymakers have become acutely 
aware of the EU’s energy security vulnerabilities. In addition, leaders have 
sought to place the EU in a leadership role in promoting the efficient use of 
energy, use of renewable energy sources and the reduction in the demand for 
fossil fuels. Finally, leaders have identified opportunities to advance the 
EU’s fundamental aims, including market integration and a common energy 
policy. Efforts have been made to integrate energy grids and networks, and 
measures are being implemented to improve energy efficiency and 
“solidarity” to help build a truly European energy market. 
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Conceptualisations of Energy Security 
Energy security studies, a relatively young field in academic research, is a 
broad topic with no settled definition upon which scholars and policymakers 
have agreed. Energy security studies touches on a wide range of fields from 
energy poverty to climate change and international relations among others. 
In addition, the use of the term “energy security” has evolved since its first 
use in academic and grey literature in the 1970s. From its initial focus on 
ensuring the supply of fuel to military forces, the topic of energy security 
studies has gone on to encompass the economy, politics and international 
relations. 
Academic Conceptualisations of Energy Security 
The complexity and the challenging nature of defining energy security is 
well noted in a 2014 paper,1 which observes that “some researchers focus 
primarily on the security of supply aspects […] while other researchers argue 
for a more comprehensive definition that includes downstream effects such 
as the impact on economic and social welfare.” This highlights the dynamic 
nature of energy security, and that it is not only researchers who have offered 
different conceptualisations, but also policy practitioners. 
An early description of energy security studies is offered by US-based 
scholars E. William Colglazier and David A. Deese, 2  who describe the 
struggle to maintain energy security as an attempt to address “vulnerability 
to damage caused by sharp price increases and shortages of petroleum 
products, triggered by a disruption of crude oil supplies occurring regionally, 
nationally, or internationally.” The effects of such a sharp increase in prices 
in such vital fuel can be observed in numerous examples, from the inability 
of automobiles to move to homes going cold in the winter due to a lack of 
heating. 
 
1  B.W. Ang, W.I. Choong & T.S. Ng, (2014). “Energy security: Definitions, 
dimensions and indexes”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 42, pp.1077-
1093. 
2  E. William Colglazier Jr & David A. Deese, (1983). “Energy and security in the 
1980s”. Annual Review of Energy 8 (1), pp.415–449. 
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This older conceptualisation of energy security is based on the concerns of 
western powers, especially those dependent on crude oil and petroleum 
imports as the United States and the United Kingdom were at the time. 
However, even by the late 1980s, this notion had begun to evolve, as 
highlighted by Daniel Yergin’s Foreign Affairs article discussing energy 
security in the upcoming decade the 1990s.3 According to Yergin, “The 
objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy 
at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values 
and objectives.” Exactly what these values and objectives entail are not 
explained in this article. 
In the 21st century, energy security has been divided by some scholars into 
subsections. A 2013 paper describes energy security on a microeconomic 
level; “the ability of households and businesses to accommodate disruptions 
of supplies in energy markets” as well as on a macroeconomic level; 
“availability of adequate, reliable and affordable energy.”4  
A somewhat similar approach is taken in a 2014 paper, though the focus 
shifts towards the history of energy security studies and its development over 
the decades from “classic” to contemporary energy security studies.5 The 
former revolves around securing the “stable supply of cheap oil under threats 
of embargoes and price manipulations by exporters.” The contemporary 
context of energy security covers challenges which “extend beyond oil 
supplies and encompass a wider range of issues.” Moreover, energy security 
is now closely entangled with other energy policy problems such as 
“providing equitable access to modern energy and mitigating climate 
change.”  
Combining the approaches in historical development and shifting areas of 
concern for policymakers, a 2011 paper describes three perspectives of 
energy security: transport for military and later civilian purposes (energy 
sovereignty); ensuring the smooth functioning of a country’s electricity 
 
3  Daniel Yergin, (1988). “Energy Security in the 1990s.” Foreign Affairs 67 (1), 
pp.110–132. 
4  Marcus King & Jay Gulledge, (2013). “The Climate Change and Energy Security 
Nexus”, The Fletcher forum of world affairs 37 (2), pp.25-44. 
5  Aleh Cherp & Jessica Jewell, (2014). “The concept of energy security: Beyond the 
four As”, Energy Policy (75), pp.415-421. 
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systems in challenging conditions (energy robustness); and ensuring the 
continued long-term viability of the wider energy market (energy 
resilience).6 
Energy sovereignty refers initially to energy security in the military sense, 
with the challenge of maintaining fuel supplies for military transport. In the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, oil replaced coal as the main source of 
energy for transport purposes and European powers quickly moved to secure 
their sources of oil in the Middle East and the Caucasus regions. After the 
Second World War, civilian priorities took centre stage in the pursuit of 
energy sovereignty, and favourable terms were sought with newly oil-
producing states. After the Oil crisis of 1973, additional measures were taken 
to ensure that energy needs continued to be met in the event of another oil 
embargo. 
The unstable and unpredictable nature of the energy market, in combination 
with its importance to the lives of billions of people across the globe, is a 
central focus from the perspective of energy resilience. Energy resilience 
focuses on a multi-faceted approach to ensuring continued access to energy, 
these facets being flexibility, adaptability and diversity. 
International Relations in Energy Politics 
Roland Dannreuther approaches energy security by blending it with his own 
field of International Relations (IR). 7  Further, he applies the differing 
approaches in International Relations theory to energy security. These 
approaches to IR can be defined as the Realist, Liberal or Radical (or 
Marxist) approaches. 
The Realist approach argues that, fundamentally, the rivalries between states 
and empires do not arise from competing ideologies or identities, but 
competition over limited natural resources and the rational self-interest of 
polities to perpetuate their existence.  
 
6  Aleh Cherp & Jessica Jewell, (2011). “The three perspectives on energy security: 
intellectual history, disciplinary roots and the potential for integration”, Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 3 (4), pp. 202-212. 
7  Roland Dannreuther, (2017). Energy Security, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
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In contrast, the Liberal approach argues that there is more to international 
relations than the competition over resources between states. Instead, 
Liberalism argues that non-state bodies such as civil society organisations 
and companies also play a major role in world affairs. This is particularly 
true in the case of companies in international energy politics, as oil and 
natural gas, two primary sources of energy for most of the world, are multi-
billion dollar industries. According to the Liberal approach the most 
effective way to ensure the continued security of energy sources is to 
facilitate fair competition in the energy market by deregulating, liberalising 
and privatising the market. 
Finally, the Radical (or Marxist) school of thought focuses mainly on justice 
for its arguments, claiming that both Liberalism and Realism are simply tools 
to prolong the life and injustice of capitalism. Dannreuther cites an example 
of radical eco-activists claiming that liberalism’s devotion to economic 
growth has played a significant role in the environmental degradation of the 
planet, and that the pursuit of wealth is the main driver behind the destruction 
of natural habitats and the looming environmental crisis of the 21st century. 
Practical Application of Energy Security Policy by the 
European Union 
The ambiguity surrounding exactly what is meant by “energy security” has 
traditionally been viewed by scholars as an issue which needs to be resolved. 
However, this does not appear to be the view taken by policy practitioners.8 
Instead, energy security has taken on political significance in the early 21st 
century, having previously been viewed merely as a technical matter in EU 
circles. Further, some scholars have argued that the proliferation of 
conceptualisations and definitions of energy security should not be seen as a 
weakness, but rather as a reflection of the reality that energy security takes 
many forms and facets. This approach offers EU policymakers some 
flexibility in tackling the many challenges facing the various member states 
in the realm of energy security. 
 
8  Zora Kovacic & Louisa Jane Di Felice. “Complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity: 
Implications for European Union energy governance”, Energy Research & Social 
Science (2019) 53, 159-169. 
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Any examination of the wealth of definitions and conceptualisations of the 
term “energy security” would not be complete without analysing the EU’s 
own conceptualisation. While the EU has not offered a concrete definition 
on which it bases its energy security goals and policy, we can gain greater 
insight into the minds of the policymakers who are devoted to maintaining 
Europe’s energy security. 
Perhaps the most important piece of legislation concerning energy security 
in the European context is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Article 194 of this treaty states that: 
“In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and 
with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union 
policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
 ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
 ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
 promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new 
and renewable forms of energy; and 
 promote the interconnection of energy networks.”9 
Two relevant themes can immediately be observed through reading this 
article. The first is the “security of supply” in the EU, and the second is the 
promotion of energy efficiency and development of renewable forms of 
energy. Further insight into the minds of EU policymakers can be gleaned 
by examining the preambles of EU legislation in the area of energy policy. 
For example, paragraph 5 of the preamble of Directive 2009/72/EC (known 
as the Electricity Directive) states that “A secure supply of electricity is of 
vital importance for the development of European society, the 
implementation of a sustainable climate change policy, and the fostering of 
competitiveness within the internal market.”10 
In recent years, the Commission has pushed to update the EU’s overall 
energy policy under a single package. The document proposing to update 
existing energy legislation through what is known as the “Winter Package” 
 
9  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Article 194, 2012/C 326/01. 
10  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC. 
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outlines the objectives behind the proposed changes.11 On the supply of 
electricity, it notes that “Security of electricity supply is indispensable in 
modern societies which largely depend on electricity and internet driven 
systems. It is therefore necessary to assess the ability of the European 
electricity system to offer sufficient generation and flexibility to ensure 
reliable electricity supply at all times.” 
EU Energy Policy since the Second World War 
Early European Institutions 
The founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 
was perhaps the most important step towards ensuring the continuation of 
peace in Europe in the first years following the devastation of the Second 
World War. The ECSC served to place the trade of coal and steel, two vital 
resources for making war, under the control of a supranational body. By 
integrating the economic and energy security needs of the participating 
states, the ECSC served to make it impossible for European powers to wage 
war on each other. After witnessing the success of the ECSC, leaders then 
sought to expand this structure to include other economic sectors. 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed by the leaders of Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. In addition to 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the Treaty also 
established the lesser-known European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). Euratom sought to establish a common atomic energy market 
among the participating states through the free flow of atomic materials, 
nuclear experts and information among others. However, the institution did 
not become involved in, or monitor, the military use of nuclear resources. 
Nor was it a supranational institution which could enforce its decisions, as 
was the case with the ECSC.12 
 
11  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
internal market for electricity. COM (2016) 861 final/2 (November 2016). 
12  Ludger Kühnhardt, (2008). “European Union – The Second Founding: The Changing 
Rationale of European Integration.” Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. 
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The Oil Crisis as a Catalyst for a Stronger European Energy Policy 
In response to western powers’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 
1973, oil-producing states in the Middle East launched an oil embargo on 
countries in Western Europe and North America. This resulted in stock 
market crashes and fuel prices skyrocketing, leaving many Americans and 
Europeans unable to perform basic daily functions. After the embargo ended 
in 1974, American and European leaders understood the need to develop a 
policy to address the vulnerabilities that arise from dependency on a single 
major supplier of energy. In 1986, the EU passed the Single European Act 
(or SEA). This gave the broader energy policy domain a greater level of 
attention and formed a framework with which the EU could develop its own 
energy security policy.  
After the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in 1992, the EU finally had the tools 
necessary to form a coherent energy security policy. However, it focused 
more on encouraging deeper integration of the European energy markets. By 
breaking up state-backed monopolies and introducing regulation aimed at 
facilitating competition, the EU, in effect, continued its longstanding policy 
of developing the Single Market. It was not until the 21st century that energy 
security really began to be seriously considered and discussed among 
European leaders, given the dependence of the new central and eastern 
European member states on Russia for their energy needs. 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed and ratified by the member states 
and entered into force. This radically changed the way energy policy would 
be formulated on the European level. Article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provided the EU with the competence to 
set the agenda on a wide range of energy matters, including:  
 ensuring the functioning of the [European] energy market; 
 ensuring security of energy supply in the Union; 
 promoting energy efficiency and energy saving and the development 
of new and renewable forms of energy 
 promoting the interconnection of energy networks. 
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For the first time, the EU gained the mandate to establish, among many other 
policy domains, a common energy security policy. In the first years 
following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU limited its focus on 
internal measures rather than conducting international energy politics. The 
“Third Package” of legislation to regulate the electricity and gas markets 
focused on measures including the “unbundling” of electricity and gas 
operators, the enhancement of energy trading systems between EU member 
states, and the strengthening of national regulatory authorities so as to ensure 
robust enforcement of EU rules. Other measures proposed by the 
Commission in this period have included funding for energy infrastructure 
projects aimed at further integrating energy markets, measures to encourage 
energy efficiency and a “solidarity” clause in a proposed bill on the 
regulation of the Security of Gas Supply.13 Aside from improving the EU’s 
internal energy infrastructure and integration, the EU has been active in 
forming closer ties with energy-producing states as a means to diversify its 
imports. For much of the last decade, the EU has worked to conclude energy 
agreements with countries including Iran, Azerbaijan and Algeria among 
others. This has been met with some success, as the Commission has 
endeavoured to complete a large-scale infrastructure project called the 
Southern Gas Corridor, which aims to connect existing pipelines including 
the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline and the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline.14 
Energy Security Strategy 2014 
Shortly after the European Parliament elections in 2014, the Commission 
published a document outlining its strategy on Energy Security. 15  The 
document contained facts and figures which were central to some of the 
 
13  Tomas Maltby, (2013). “European Union Energy Policy Integration: A Case of 
European Commission Policy Entrepreneurship and Increasing Supranationalism”, 
Energy Policy, 55 (100), pp.435-444. 
14  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on an 
EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage. COM (2016) 49 final (February 
2016). 
15  Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - European 
Energy Security Strategy. COM (2014) 330 final (May 2014). 
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concerns of the member states and the EU at large. At the time of publication 
in 2014, the EU imported 53 % of its overall energy needs. Further, eastern 
European member states were disproportionately dependent on energy 
imports from a single supplier, in particular the Baltic states. Finally, the 
strategy document predicted that energy demand within the EU would rise 
by 27 % by 2030. With these vulnerabilities threatening the integrity of the 
single market, in addition to continued access to uninterrupted energy 
supply, the strategy outlined some key measures which could be taken to 
address these vulnerabilities in the short and long term. 
First, the strategy highlighted the need to immediately take steps to prepare 
eastern member states for a potential repeat of the 2006 and 2009 disruptions 
to the flow of natural gas through Ukraine.16 This was in response to the 
Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, which itself 
was a response to the Euromaidan revolution which saw the removal of pro-
Russian president Viktor Yanukovych from power.  
In the longer term, a key measure proposed by the document was to insert a 
solidarity clause in energy security legislation so as to mandate member 
states to supply energy to others facing disruptions. This would work by 
improving cooperation between the national regulatory authorities of the 
member states in matters including risk assessments, contingency planning 
and designing measures to protect strategic energy infrastructure. 
Another proposal in this strategy document was to moderate the increase in 
energy demand within the EU. As the EU member states spent €400 billion 
in energy imports in 2013, the Commission expressed an interest in 
preventing the bill from climbing further. A 27 % increase in demand as 
predicted by the Commission would result in a bill of €508 billion in 2030. 
To that end, the strategy document proposed that member states should 
redouble their efforts to implement measures aimed at meeting their 2020 
reductions in carbon emissions, provide financial support towards efforts to 
renovate buildings with environmentally friendly materials and promote 
funding for more efficient energy providing services. 
 
16  Robert W. Orttung & Indra Overland, (2011). “A Limited Toolbox: Explaining the 
Constraints on Russia's Foreign Energy Policy”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2 (1) 
74-85. 
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The Internal market 
As highlighted previously, the EU considers protection of the integrity of the 
internal market to be of vital importance. The strategy document highlights 
the Commission’s aim to expand the internal market into the realm of energy 
in a number of ways. First, by encouraging EU-wide discussion of national 
decisions on energy infrastructure, the Commission hopes to avoid situations 
where national policy decisions can undermine the energy security of another 
member state. This is aimed to be done through availing of existing policy 
tools such as legislation relating to the internal market and the control of state 
aid to facilitate EU-level decision-making on energy policy. 
Further, the strategy document details the Commission’s plan to develop the 
European electricity and gas markets as well as the steps previously taken to 
this effect. The document looks to the example of the Nordic countries, who 
have integrated their energy markets, as well as north-western member states 
who have collaborated on integrated energy infrastructure projects. Seeking 
to push the EU into taking a stronger stance in facilitating deeper integration 
of energy markets, the document proposes funding critical infrastructure 
projects in the short term and robust enforcement of gas sector Network 
Codes and anti-trust legislation in the longer term. 
Increasing energy production within the EU 
As the EU’s indigenous fossil fuels do not produce enough energy to meet 
the needs of its population, the strategy document proposes taking steps to 
maximise the use of European-produced energy by increasing the production 
of renewable energy to meet a target of 27 % of overall energy use in the EU 
by 2030. The Commission proposes that the private sector bear most of the 
costs of building the infrastructure needed to bring renewable energy sources 
online.  
In addition, the document proposes that conventional gas and oil reserves 
within the EU should be exploited. While this recommendation is qualified 
by its further recommendation to exploit these reserves compliant with 
environmental regulations, this nevertheless underscores the primacy of 
energy security concerns in the minds of European leaders over concerns of 
climate change. To mitigate the harmful effects of fossil fuel extraction, the 
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strategy document highlights the potential for carbon capture technology to 
be deployed on a wider scale in Europe. As such, it notes that “further efforts 
in research, development and deployment should be made in order to fully 
benefit from this technology.” 
The Formation of the Energy Union 
This section examines the run-up to the launch of the European 
Commission’s flagship project to improve the EU’s overall energy policy: 
the Energy Union. This revolves around efforts made by top EU officials to 
address weaknesses in the EU’s energy policy, including the lack of 
integration in energy infrastructure and the differences between member 
states on their energy security priorities. Following this analysis, discussion 
shifts towards the governance of the Energy Union and its efforts to increase 
policy output, cooperation from the member states and increase the 
integration of the European energy market. After the ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the EU was now able to make moves towards securing the 
supply of energy for its member states. After the events in Ukraine in late 
2013 and early 2014, the EU began working behind the scenes to better 
protect the energy security of the member states. The Third Energy Package 
had already gone some way towards helping those vulnerable states to wean 
themselves off their dependence on a single source for their energy needs, 
but a new, more focused effort was required to safeguard the progress 
already made and to take further steps in improving energy security. 
Advent and aims of the Energy Union 
In April 2014, Donald Tusk, former Prime Minister of Poland and President 
of the European Council, wrote a piece for the Financial Times, in which he 
called for an “energy union” to tackle issues such as “breaking up the 
Russian gas monopoly and restoring free market competition.”17 Shortly 
thereafter, the Commission launched the Energy Union, a project aimed at 
improving the EU’s overall energy policy output. According to a document 
 
17  Donald Tusk, D (2014, April 21). “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy 
stranglehold”, Financial Times. 
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published by the Commission, the Energy Union’s main goals are as 
follows:18 
 Energy security, solidarity and trust 
 A fully-integrated internal energy market 
 Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand 
 Decarbonising the economy 
 Research, innovation and competitiveness 
In his first speech as President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker 
stated that “We need to pool resources, combine infrastructures, and unite 
our negotiating power vis-à-vis third countries. We need to diversify our 
energy sources and reduce the high energy dependency of several of our 
member states.”19  
This paper focuses on the energy security component of the Energy 
Union’s aims. 
In a 2014 document outlining the EU’s energy security strategy, the 
Commission outlines seven key steps aimed at achieving the goal of 
energy.20  This paper focuses on two of these steps: diversifying supply 
sources and routes; and the protection of critical infrastructure. As this paper 
strives to focus on the political dynamics of energy security in Europe and 
beyond, particular focus is devoted to the steps which prioritise European 
and international energy politics.  
 
18  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Investment Bank – A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union 
with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. COM (2015) 80 final (February 
2015). 
19  Jean-Claude Juncker (2014, July 15). “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, 
Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change”. Online at: https://www.eesc.europa.eu/ 
resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker---political-guidelines.pdf. 
20  Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - European 
Energy Security Strategy. COM (2014) 330 final (May 2014). 
Cillian O‘Gara 
14 
 
Governance of the Energy Union 
In 2016, the year following the launch of the Energy Union, the EU 
published a proposal to update existing energy legislation to reflect the 
priorities of the Commission under the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker. 
The so-called “Winter Package” of legislation concerning energy has been 
passed, and, as of late 2019, is awaiting publication in the Official Journal of 
the European Union. Perhaps unsurprisingly, literature discussing the 
package in depth is in rather short supply. Nevertheless, one can develop an 
impression of the overhaul through analysing the available literature and gain 
a greater understanding of the legal and political dynamics of the Energy 
Union. 
Researchers and social scientists have conducted numerous studies and 
literature reviews aimed at settling on a working definition for energy 
security with the aim of simplifying research and policy formulation for 
researchers and practitioners alike. As such, the ambiguity of the 
conceptualisation of energy security is seen as an issue which must be 
resolved if the effective study of energy security is to occur. This is in 
contrast to the EU’s approach of sticking with a basic definition of the 
security of energy supply provided for in the TFEU. 
Upon examination of other material, in particular Article 194 TFEU, the 
security of the supply of gas is central to European energy security policy. 
This makes sense given the reference made to the security of energy supply 
as a whole in Article 192 TFEU. One of the most comprehensive measures 
to ensure the security of the supply of natural gas has been the passage of 
Regulation 2017/1938 (or the Gas Supply Regulation). This regulation 
places the responsibility of securing gas supplies on the member states, gas 
companies and the Commission to varying degrees. 
Some of the key components of the regulation include the following: 
 Requiring the European Network for Transmission System Operators 
for Gas (ENTSO-G) to perform an EU-wide gas supply and 
infrastructure disruption simulation in order to provide a high level 
overview of the major energy supply risks for the EU. 
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 Requiring EU countries to cooperate with each other in regional 
groups to assess common supply risks together and to develop and 
agree on joint preventative and emergency measures. 
 Introducing the solidarity principle, in which EU countries must help 
each other by guaranteeing continued gas supply to the most 
vulnerable consumers, even including those in severe gas crisis 
situations. 
 Improving transparency by requiring natural gas companies to 
officially notify their national regulatory authority of their major long-
term supply contracts that may be relevant to the security of energy 
supply. 
 Ensuring that decisions on whether pipelines should have permanent 
bi-directional capacity (reverse flow) take into consideration the views 
of all EU countries that could potentially benefit. Transmission system 
operators must enable permanent bi-directional capacity on all cross-
border interconnections between EU countries unless an exemption is 
granted. 
In their assessment of the governance of the Energy Union, Marc Ringel and 
Michèle Knodt focus on the open method of coordination (or OMC) between 
stakeholders in policy formation.21 The OMC is one of many tools deployed 
during EU policymaking processes and is more intergovernmental in nature 
than some others.  
More specifically, “The OMC does not result in EU legislation, but is a 
method of soft governance which aims to spread best practice and achieve 
convergence towards EU goals in those policy areas which fall under the 
partial or full competence of Member States.”22 
Additionally, Ringel and Knodt have focused their analysis on the Energy 
Union’s overall governance, of which energy security plays a minor part. 
This means that while this article does not discuss energy security in detail, 
 
21  Marc Ringel & Michèle Knodt, (2019). “The governance of the European Energy 
Union: Efficiency, effectiveness and acceptance of the Winter Package 2016”, 
Energy Policy, 112, pp.209-220. 
22  European Parliament, “The Open Method of Coordination”. Online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-542142-Open-Method-of-
Coordination-FINAL.pdf 
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many of the assessments and discussion on policy formation apply to energy 
security as well as other policy areas of the Energy Union. With this being 
said, the authors highlighted some interesting findings which are relevant 
with regards to policy output in the context of the Energy Union. 
First, the authors’ assessment of the Energy Union’s governance 
effectiveness found that the regular publication of policy documents, reports 
and plans positively influenced developments in policy. Further, the authors 
highlighted that, by having the EU make certain energy policy measures 
obligatory for member states to follow, these measures become more likely 
to be implemented by the member states. 
Second, the authors noted that in order for the Energy Union’s governance 
system to be effective, there must exist a high level of acceptance among the 
member states. A lack of acceptance in the form of delays in reporting 
progress in various policy areas related to energy risks undermining the 
effectiveness of the governance of the Energy Union. As the Energy Union 
is still young, there are some improvements that can help the Commission 
and the member states increase energy policy output. However, these 
improvements depend on cooperation between these stakeholders and it is 
unclear whether such cooperation will be forthcoming. 
The State of the Energy Union 
The publication of four reports on the state of the Energy Union gives us a 
deeper insight into the Energy Union’s aims and the challenges it faces 
today and into the future. By examining the four reports on the state of the 
Energy Union, this section aims to help gain insight into the Commission’s 
mindset and what Commission officials consider when measuring the 
success of the project. 
As part of the Energy Union’s launch, the Commission published its first 
report on the “State of the Energy Union” in November 2015.23 In it, the 
Commission described the key methods it would seek to deploy to achieve 
 
23  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Investment Bank - State of the Energy Union 2015. COM (2015) 572 final 
(November 2015). 
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the goals outlined above. In the area of energy security, the Commission 
hailed the EU’s determination to see Ukraine remain a key transit country of 
Russian natural gas and its efforts to facilitate peace talks between Ukraine 
and Russia over the war in the Donbass. In addition, the Commission 
reiterated that the EU would only support energy infrastructure projects that 
would increase the diversification of energy sources. This comment was 
made in the backdrop of the controversy over Germany’s decision to join 
Russia in the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. 
In the most recent report on the state of the Energy Union, published in April 
2019, the Commission hailed its achievements of the last four years, 
including facilitating deeper integration of European energy infrastructure, 
its newfound ability to speak with one voice on the world stage and 
improving the energy security of the member states. 24  However, it also 
recognised that key challenges remain to be addressed, and the Energy Union 
faces numerous shortcomings that must be overcome if it is to robustly 
pursue its objectives. 
Progress of the Energy Union 2015-2019 
After the first report on the State of the Energy Union, the Commission 
published three further reports: one in February 2017, the next in November 
2017 and the final one in April 2019. Each of these documents have followed 
a similar pattern of summarising the Energy Union’s main achievements, 
challenges and steps which could be taken to address concerns. This section 
highlights and discusses the key relevant aspects of the second and third 
reports before analysing the most recent report in depth. 
The second report was the first to report on the project’s condition since its 
launch. In this report, the Commission identified key developments in the 
energy policy sphere, including the member states’ transition to a lower-
carbon economy, the efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the 
economic growth of the member states in spite of the supposed “burden” of 
 
24  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European 
Investment Bank – Fourth Report on the State of the Energy Union. COM (2019) 
175 final (April 2019). 
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transitioning to a lower carbon economy. With regards to energy security 
more specifically, the Commission reported advancements in developing so-
called “future-proof” infrastructure, in keeping with the Energy Union’s goal 
of protecting critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. Such advancements 
included progress in infrastructure projects such as the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline, new Liquefied Natural Gas terminals in several countries and 
investment for a new pipeline connecting Estonia and Finland. The report 
goes on further to explore the Commission’s progress in forming an 
international presence in the realm of energy politics. Aside from 
participating in other international fora including the G7, G20 and the 
International Energy Agency, the EU has made moves to develop bilateral 
ties with energy producing states such as Algeria and the energy transit hub 
Ukraine. A similar pattern of progress, difficulties and policy developments 
is present in the following report published in November 2017. For example, 
the themes of energy transition and future-proof infrastructure are again 
present in the third report, with progress in the digitisation of infrastructure 
enabling improved grid management and response times. In addition, the 
EU’s international overtures are summarised, including the organisation’s 
support for the G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth, 
energy agreements with India and Japan and progress in EU relations with 
Ukraine as well as African partners. 
Achievements of the Energy Union so far 
The fourth report on the state of the energy union summarises the progress 
made in achieving the EU’s aims, as well as its shortcomings and upcoming 
challenges. 
First, the EU has passed legislation to secure the supply of natural gas and to 
increase risk preparedness in the electricity sector. In addition, significant 
advancements have been made in improving the “design” of the European 
electricity market through price convergence and cross-border exchanges of 
electricity. Further, a common framework for capacity mechanisms agreed 
by the member states has been set to improve harmonisation and to assist the 
member states in reaching the EU’s decarbonisation goals. These efforts all 
aim to improve the flow of energy within the EU, facilitate greater expansion 
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of renewable sources of energy, and improve the efficiency of the use of 
energy within the EU. 
With regards to natural gas more specifically, European leaders have agreed 
to revise the Gas Directive of 2009. As is explored later in this paper, this 
was done partially in response to the political controversy erupting as a result 
of Germany’s deal with Russia to build a pipeline in the Baltic Sea to bypass 
Ukraine as a transit hub. 
The fourth report pays particular attention to the efforts made to address the 
energy isolation of the Baltic states, who have relied almost exclusively on 
imports from Russia to meet their energy needs. As of the publication of the 
report in April 2019, the Baltic states have connected their energy 
infrastructure with states including Sweden, Finland and Poland, resulting in 
an interconnection level of 23.7 %. Efforts are now focused on connecting 
the Baltic states’ infrastructure with the rest of the continent by 2025 and 
new efforts are being made to increase the connectivity of critical 
infrastructure between Iberia and France to 10 % over the next decade. 
The EU’s efforts to diversify sources of natural gas for its member states 
have been met with some success, and now all but one of the member states 
have access to at least two independent energy sources. This is expected to 
increase to three independent sources for all member states except Malta and 
Cyprus by 2022 if current infrastructure projects such as the Southern Gas 
Corridor are completed on schedule. In addition, the shift towards liquefied 
natural gas (LNG), which can be transported over longer distances than 
natural gas carried by pipelines, has also given the member states more 
available options with which they may wean off their dependence on a single 
source. 
Finally, the Commission has worked to implement what it calls “energy 
resilience”: reorganising energy infrastructure so as to make it better able to 
absorb shocks without causing widespread disruption. To that end, the EU 
has invested over €5 billion in projects aimed at increasing the integration of 
European energy networks. The results of these investments will take years 
to bear fruit, yet the Commission’s forward-looking and long-term planning 
capabilities gives the EU a key advantage in helping the member states to 
build vital infrastructure which will improve their energy security situation. 
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Shortcomings and Challenges 
There still exist some pressing issues in the short to medium term that the 
Commission has been keen to highlight in the latest report. Despite the 
progress made in integrating electricity grids, the report claims that much 
larger amounts of investments are required over the next decade in order to 
not only increase the rate of integration, but also to digitise and “smarten” 
electricity grids. 
In addition, the social challenges arising from the transition to a lower-
carbon economy has not been ignored in this report. The report highlights 
that there are 185,000 jobs in coal extraction across 41 coal-producing 
regions in 12 member states, each of which are at risk of being lost in the 
shift towards low-carbon and renewable energy. The Commission has 
already taken steps to provide support to these workers, such as “creating an 
open platform that brings together all affected stakeholders [...] to exchange 
best practices, foster peer learning, and receive information on EU support 
instruments that are available” in addition to providing tailored support to 
member states to smooth the transition. Tools to help the member states in 
this endeavour include EU funds, financing tools and programmes of various 
types. 
Finally, the report makes reference to energy poverty, the first time it is 
mentioned in the context of European energy policy (outside of the need to 
collect data). 50 million people in the EU are reported to be affected by 
energy poverty, and the Commission has proposed to improve investments 
in energy efficiency for households. This policy domain is still in its infancy 
but has steadily developed since the inception of the Energy Union. As the 
member states conduct their own analyses on the number of energy-poor 
households, this policy domain is expected to increase in importance, 
especially given the overall objective of energy security to protect the supply 
of energy to households and businesses. 
Challenges facing the Energy Union beyond 2019 
With the formation of the new Commission expected to be complete by 
November 2019, a number of new challenges face the newcomers. First, the 
goal to reduce carbon emissions by 20 % from the levels recorded in 1990, 
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while on track to be met in 2020, will fall short in several member states. 
The next Commission will have to grapple with the continuing reality that 
the governments of the member states often place short-term economic 
growth ahead of long-term climate action. 
In terms of energy security, the Commission should continue to take steps to 
improve and integrate the energy infrastructure of the member states. To this 
effect, it will need to find a way to attract large-scale investment, from 
national governments and the EU itself to the private sector. However, with 
projections estimating that investments of up to €500 billion would be 
required to complete the necessary overhaul of energy infrastructure to meet 
carbon reduction and security aims, this will be an enormous challenge that 
will take years if not decades to make significant progress in achieving. 
Having resolved the controversy over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project (at 
least temporarily) and being well on the way towards integrating the energy 
networks of previously vulnerable eastern European states, the EU may also 
wish to shift its focus more towards developing the Southern Gas Corridor 
further. The Corridor’s construction has been praised by high-ranking US 
officials such as Assistant State Secretary for Energy Resources Francis R. 
Fannon, who said that “Our steadfast support of the 40 billion-dollar-plus 
Southern Gas Corridor has spanned multiple Administrations and continues 
today despite the fact that there is no direct American investment in the 
project.”25  
A major issue developing in the Mediterranean concerns tension arising 
between Cyprus and Turkey over the latter’s drilling operations off the 
northern coast of Cyprus. The northern half of Cyprus declared 
independence after being invaded and occupied by Turkish forces in 1974, a 
move which has never been recognised internationally. In recent years, 
Turkey has sought to explore Cyprus’ northern waters for oil and gas, much 
to the dismay of not just the Cypriot government, but also the EU. 
 
25  Francis R. Fannon, (2018). “Remarks at Event Honoring 25th Anniversary of the 
Department of State’s Partnership With the Petroleum Equipment and Services 
Association (PESA)”. Online at: https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-
bureau-of-energy-resources/remarks-at-event-honoring-25th-anniversary-of-the-
department-of-states-partnership-with-the-petroleum-equipment-and-services-
association-pesa/. 
Cillian O‘Gara 
22 
 
In July 2019 the EU suspended contact between high-level officials and 
withdrew financial aid amounting close to $150 million to Turkey in 
response to Turkey’s drilling operations. In addition, the EU has requested 
the European Investment Bank to review its lending practices with the 
country, which was valued at $438 million in 2018. 26  This has not 
discouraged Turkey, which, less than a month later, sent a third drilling 
vessel towards Cyprus on the eve of peace negotiations between the Cypriot 
government and the ethnically Turkish northern Cypriot leadership. 
The Nord Stream 2 Controversy and the Gas Directive 
In the wake of Germany’s agreement with Russia to construct a new gas 
pipeline connecting the two countries via the Baltic Sea, several member 
states raised concerns over the project’s potential to increase the dependence 
of eastern European states on Russia for their energy needs. Seeking to 
address these concerns, the Commission proposed a directive that would 
limit Russia’s control of the pipeline and strengthen its own influence in 
major energy infrastructure projects. 
Examination of the Gas Directive 
In April 2019, the Gas Directive entered into force.27 While some of the main 
components of the legislation have been touched on in the paragraphs above, 
it is worth exploring these in more detail from political and legal 
perspectives. First, this section looks at the Directive’s aims as provided for 
in the preamble before exploring the main relevant provisions of the 
Directive. This section then explores the Directive’s strengths and 
weaknesses from the perspective of the relevant member states as well as 
from a neutral perspective.  
 
26  Matina Stevis-Gridneff, M. (2019, July 15). “E.U. Punishes Turkey for Gas Drilling 
Off Cyprus Coast”. The New York Times. 
27  Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas. 
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Aims of the Directive 
Paragraph 3 of the preamble to the Gas Directive states that it “seeks to 
address obstacles to the completion of the internal market in natural gas 
which result from the non-application of Union market rules to gas 
transmission lines to and from third countries.” To that end, it is designed to 
include non-EU member states (or “third countries”) within the remit of 
currently existing rules. This is purportedly aimed at ensuring the 
“consistency of the legal framework within the Union while avoiding 
distortion of competition in the internal energy market in the Union and 
negative impacts on the security of supply.” 
Summary of the Main Components 
The main change to EU law on the regulation of natural gas with respect to 
energy security can be seen in the amendment of Article 36 of the 2009 Gas 
Directive. On the whole, this article allows for major gas infrastructure 
projects to be exempted from specific provisions, including regulatory 
interventions such as the unbundling of transmission systems and 
transmission system operators, mandatory third party (usually competitors) 
access to infrastructure and regulation from national regulatory authorities. 
The original article, under section 1 paragraph (e), states that “the exemption 
must not be detrimental to competition or the effective functioning of the 
internal market in natural gas, or the efficient functioning of the regulated 
system to which the infrastructure is connected.” The amended version under 
the 2019 Gas Directive adds an energy security consideration, stating that 
“the exemption must not be detrimental to competition in the relevant 
markets which are likely to be affected by the investment, to the effective 
functioning of the internal market in natural gas, the efficient functioning of 
the regulated systems concerned, or to security of supply of natural gas in 
the Union.” 
This gives the regulatory authorities the mandate to reject applications of 
exemption if there is a risk to the continued supply of natural gas to a given 
country or region. 
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Perhaps the most contentious amendment, negotiated between France and 
Germany, concerns the power of national regulatory authorities and when 
they should apply EU rules to infrastructure originating from a third country 
under Article 41, section 1 paragraph (c). While the Commission had sought 
the authority to govern the rules and regulations of infrastructure originating 
from a third country, this amendment grants such power to the national 
regulatory authorities. 
In the case of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, this allows German 
regulatory authorities to cooperate with Russian authorities concerning 
various aspects of the project. This is reinforced by a further amendment, 
this time an added section to Article 42, stating that “regulatory authorities, 
or where appropriate other competent authorities, may consult and cooperate 
with the relevant authorities of third countries in relation to the operation of 
gas infrastructure to and from third countries with a view  to ensuring, as 
regards the infrastructure concerned, that this Directive is applied 
consistently in  the territory and territorial sea of a Member State.” 
Effects and Reception of the Directive 
While the directive will not be transposed into national law until February 
2020, there is a wealth of discussion and analyses, and the affected parties 
have made their opinions on the directive well-known. Due to the 
compromising nature of the directive, it is perhaps unsurprising that its 
passage has been met with mixed reactions. 
While the opponents of Nord Stream 2, who had originally hoped to see the 
project stalled or even abandoned as a result of this directive may be 
disappointed, there are some components of the directive that should help to 
alleviate the concerns of some sceptics of the pipeline project. The key 
relevant measure under the directive, namely the extension of EU rules and 
regulations to pipelines that fall partly outside of EU territory, is the single 
largest safeguard against potential foreign interference against the continued 
supply of natural gas to the EU member states. This means that foreign 
enterprises and operators are now subject to such regulatory measures as 
unbundling (or the separation of activities into relevant divisions) and the 
mandatory granting of infrastructure access to competitors. 
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In response to the directive, Nord Stream 2 has brought about legal 
proceedings before the General Court to annul the directive. In April 2019, 
Nord Stream 2 triggered a three-month consultation period with the 
Commission aimed at reaching an amicable settlement. Now that the three-
month period has elapsed, the project’s backers have reserved the right to 
pursue international arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty and are 
eager to have as many tools at its disposal as possible in order to kill the 
amendment directive. 
Not all reception of the passage of the amended Gas Directive has been 
negative. In an interview with EURACTIV, Polish MEP Jerzy Buzek called 
the Franco-German compromise of the Directive “good news not only for 
Poland, but for all the EU member states.”28 He argued that the extension of 
EU rules into pipelines outside of EU territory would force third countries to 
follow EU rules when exporting natural gas into the bloc. In addition, he 
claimed that, despite the compromise reached by France and Germany, the 
Commission would still have the final say on who can negotiate with third 
countries on infrastructure projects. 
The US has also hailed EU efforts to secure its supply of energy and diversify 
its sources geographically, not least because the US stands to gain by selling 
LNG to EU member states. Assistant State Secretary for Energy Resources 
Francis R. Fannon has made numerous remarks urging the EU to kill the 
Nord Stream 2 project, accusing Russia of using energy for “coercive 
geopolitical aims.” 29  In addition, the US has threatened Germany with 
sanctions if it proceeds with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 
Conclusion 
Having explored numerous conceptualisations and the path towards the EU’s 
current energy security policy, this paper concludes that, while it has taken 
 
28  Karolina Zbytniewska, (2019, February 17). “Jerzy Buzek: Deal on Nord Stream 2 
is good for Poland and EU”. EURACTIV. Online at: https://www.euractiv.com/ 
section/energy/interview/jerzy-buzek-deal-on-nord-stream-2-is-good-for-poland-
and-eu/. 
29  Francis R. Fannon, (2018, October 10). “Remarks at the 2018 Oil and Money 
Conference”. Online at: https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-
energy-resources/remarks-at-the-2018-oil-and-money-conference/. 
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decades of often slow-moving progress for European states to form any 
semblance of a common energy security strategy, they have come further in 
doing so than any previous attempt in European history. Energy security has 
evolved from being pursued purely by nation states with vastly different 
priorities to European states negotiating with each other to form common 
stances on important energy matters. This practice of negotiation and 
compromise has been strengthened further through the launch of the Energy 
Union, a comprehensive framework that facilitates greater energy policy 
output and investment into energy-related infrastructure projects. 
Development of the EU’s Energy Security policy 
The European Union had no comprehensive energy security policy to speak 
of in the 20th century. Instead, European leaders focused their efforts in the 
1970s and 1980s on expanding the organisation’s policy competences, 
among them energy in the general sense. Energy security finally gained 
prominence in the 21st century as the EU welcomed 12 new member states 
in 2004 and 2007. The dependence on many of these member states for 
Russian energy became a source of concern for European leaders, and the 
Treaty of Lisbon made the first reference to the EU’s commitment to 
securing the supply of energy for its member states. 
The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was accompanied by the passage of the 
Third Energy Package of legislation aimed at regulating the energy market 
and improving its security. Further, the EU has boosted efforts to forge 
relationships with energy-producing states such as Algeria, Iran, Azerbaijan 
and others. This has been met with some success, and the Southern Gas 
Corridor, a series of pipelines connecting the European Mediterranean to the 
Caspian Sea, is currently being constructed. 
What progress has the EU made in achieving its 
security policy ambitions? 
Despite the successes achieved in recent decades, the often sensitive nature 
of energy security has forced European leaders to be especially cautious not 
to incur the wrath of individual member states or neighbouring suppliers. 
The controversy of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project has highlighted the 
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complex challenge that EU leaders face in balancing the energy security 
concerns of one member state with those of another. 
Nevertheless, that the EU has managed to make progress in assisting former 
Soviet satellite states from reducing their dependence on Russian energy is 
an impressive feat. The EU has also facilitated a partial shift among its 
member states away from carbon-emitting fossil fuels and towards 
renewable sources of energy. This has been achieved through a spirit of 
compromise, and the recognition that different energy security dynamics 
exist among the member states. 
The most comprehensive measure aimed at securing the supply of natural 
gas from third countries, the Gas Directive, faces an uncertain future due to 
legal challenges by Nord Stream 2’s backers. However, it nevertheless 
signals a willingness on the European level to tackle a complex challenge 
with economic, political and technical elements. Regardless of the status of 
a specific piece of legislation, the EU has made significant progress in 
understanding the role that energy security plays in ensuring the overall 
security of the member states, as well as facilitating deeper integration 
between the member states. 
Without a spirit of compromise being present in the EU, one can only 
speculate what energy politics would look like in Europe today. Perhaps the 
eastern European states, even if nominally independent from Russia, would 
remain utterly dependent on their giant neighbour for their basic energy 
needs. Perhaps several blocs of states with common energy interests would 
band together in opposition to others. This would be highly dangerous as 
Europe would once more be divided into small chunks, and the balance of 
power mechanism which failed so many times in European history would 
return. That European leaders have managed to build on the successes of the 
EEC to gradually form an energy security policy that is as comprehensive as 
it is, is a remarkable achievement. 
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